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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
STATE OF UTAH, by and
through its ROAD COMMISSION,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.

Case No.

THOMAS P. WILLIAMS and
JO ANN H. WILLIAMS, his wife,
Defendants and Appellants.

11388

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
NATURE OF THE CASE
Respondent, State of Utah, by and through its Road
Commission, initiated a condemnation action to acquire a
fee simple interest in certain properties owned by the appellant and located at approximately Cherry Lane and Unitah Junction, Davis County, Utah. The aquisition cons.isted
of .10 acres from a total of .43 acres. The portion within the take was in a rectangular shape approximately 37 feet
in width and 114.64 feet in length and was located on the
west side of appellant's property.
The sole issue presented by this appeal is the compensability of certain damages allegedly sustained by appellants.

,..,.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The matter was heard by the Honorable Parley E. Norseth, sitting without a jury. The court rendered a judgment
in favor of appellant and against respondent in the amount
of $7 50.00 for the .10 acre involved in the take and $3,200 for
severance damages to the remainder, for a total judgment of
$3,950.00.
Trial counsel for respondent, as distinguished from
counsel for respondent on this appeal, filed an objection to
defendants' findings of fact and conclusions of law (R.26.)
However, no record of the disposition of respondent's objection exists.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Respondent submits that the judgment of the lower
court should be affirmed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent •grees with the statement of facts as set
forth in appella ~s· brief with the following modifications.
Because of the lack of a transcript of the trial proceedings,
appellant's reference to the testimony of respondent's inde·
pendent fee appfiaiser, Memory Cain, is based solely on the
affidavit of couni>el for appellant. However, respondent submits that by the certification of the issue presented to this
cou.rt on appeal, appellants have conceded the fact that the
damages for which appellants were denied compensation
were not special, unique or peculiar to appellants' property,
but were, rather, the type of damage sustained by the public
in general.
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Respondent would also disagree wi'th appellants' statement that the issue presented by this appeal. was resolved
in the case of Board of Education of Logan City v. Croft,
13 U.2d 310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962).
ARGUMENT
It must first be recognized and conceded that not all
potential elements of damage are compensable. The production of evidence of ~n alleged damage is not proof that
such damage is an item entitling an aggrieved landowner to
compensation. The determination of the existence of a compensable severance damage as against a noncompensabJe;
consequential damage must be made by the trial· court as a
matter of law. The instant case presents the issue of what
criteria must be utilized in determining whether an alleged
aggrieance is properly includable within an award for severance damage.

The framework within which condemnation cases are
tried is not blanket authority on which the Jandowner may
predicate any conceivable damage. As sta ~d in State of
Arizona v. Wilson, et al, 4 Ariz.App. 420, < ;0 P.2d 992i 998
t J
(1966):
... we do not believe that our Supreme Court has ·
intended the "before" versus "after" test to be used .
in such manner as to include noncompensable dam~
age within the award to proper'ty owners in condemnation actions.
Also, in People v. Ricciardi; 144 P.29 779 (1944), the Supreme Court of California stated at 144 P.2d 802, "not ever:V
depreciation in the value of property not taken can be made
the basis of an award for damages."
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The distinction between compensable severance damages
and noncompensable consequential damages is predicated on
a test or requirement that contains two separate, but conjunctive, considerations. Although the test has been enunciated in many jurisdictions, it has sustained only minor modifications in the terminology involved and not basic discrepancies in the foundation, logic or reason of the test.
The first consideration in determining the element of
compensability is that the damage to the remaining property
must be a direct result and causily connected to the diminution in value of the remaining property by virtue of
the loss of the area included with the take.
This court has recognized this requirement in State by
State Road Commission v. Rozzelle, 101 U. 464, 120 P.2d 276
(1941), wherein it is stated at 120 P.2d 278:
To the extent that the present taking or construction
so violates condemnees rights, he is entitled to recover; but be the loss what it may it must have a
causal connection with the taking of the property
or construction thereon. (Emphasis added.)
Also, this court has recently stated in State of Utah, by
and through its Road Commission, v. Stanger, 21 U.2d
185, 442 P.2d 941 (1968):
... that severance damages were those suffered by
a devaluation of the owner's property not taken, the
sausa causa causans of which was the actual taking
of a part of a unit of property, the whole of which
he previously owned. (442 P.2d 942).
The existence of this first requirements 1s recognized
by appellant on page 17 of appellants' brief.
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The second consideration is that the damage resulting
to the remaining property must be such as to be special,
unique and peculiar to that property and not sustained by the
public in genera.I.
In Department of Public Works and Building v. Hubbard, 363 Ill. 99, 1 N.E.2d 383 (1936), the Supreme Court
of Illinois stated at 1 N.S.2d 385:

To entitle a claimant in a condemnation proceeding
to compensation for lands not taken, he must prove
by competent evidence that there has been some
direct physical disturbance of a right, either public
or private, which he enjoys in connection with his
property, and that by reason of such disturbance
he has sustained a special damage with respect to
his property in excess of that sustained by the public
generally. (Emphasis ·added.)
See also Illinois-Iowa Power Co. v. Guest, 370 Ill. 160,
18 N.E.2d 193 (1938).

In State of New Mexico v. Silva, 71 N.Mex. 350 378 P.2d
595 (1962), the Supreme Court of New Mexico stated at

378 P.2d 596:
Courts are agreed that only one whose damage, occasioned by highway improvement, is special and
direct as distinguished from remote and consequential, and which differs in kind from that of the general public, suffers a compensable injury.
The State of Wyoming has also followed this principal
Sheridan Drive-In Theater, Inc. v. State of Wyoming,
384 P.2d 579 (1963). and State Highway Commission.'!r of
Wyoming v. Newton, 395 P.2d 606 (1964).
in
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In City of Los Angeles v. Geiger, 210 P.2d 717 (1949),
the California District Court of Appeal, Second District,
stated at 210 P.2d 723:
While the recovery of damages is not limited to instances of actual invasion of the land itself, yet
damages can be justified only by evidence of direct
physical disturbances of an existing right, either
public or private, which the owner possesses in connection with his property and which gives an additional value to it and by evidence that through such
disturbance he has sustained a special damage with
respect to his property or to a right appurtenant
thereto different from or in excess of that suffered
by the public in general.
In Muse v. Mississippi State Highway Commission, 103

So.2d 839 (1958), the Supreme Court of Mississippi stated
that severance damages should be computed without considering, " . . . general benefits or injuries resulting from
the use to which the land taken is to be put, and are shared
by the general public." (At 103 So.2d 849).
The basic distinction between compensable severance
damage and noncompensable consequential damage may
thus be stated as follows: Damages to a remaining property
which are directly and causily connected to the taking or
the construction activities thereon and which are special,
unique and peculiar and not sustained by the public in general may be considered compensable. Those damages to the
remaining property which are not causily connected to the
take or are not special, unique or peculiar from those suffered by the public in general are not compensable.

7
By certification of the issue presented by this appeal,
appellants concede that the damages not a'llowed by the
trial court were not of a special, unique and peculiar nature,
but were, rather, of the type and nature sustained by the
public in general. Also, appellants do not challenge the trial
court findings in this· regard. Rather, appellan'ts insist
findings that the requirement of special, unique and peculiar
damage does not exist.
The necessity of the conjunctive application of the two
requirements may be illustrated. To comply with the criteria of compensable severance damage as se t forth in State
of Utah, by and through its Road Commi!;sion v. Stanger,
supra, the damages to the remainder must be directly caused
and connected to tbe take. However, if the damage to the
by the public in general, it may not be said to be direct
by the pulblici n general, it may not be said to be the direct
result of the take.
1

In the instant case, appellants concede that the damage
which was not allowed by the trial court was not. of the
special nature. How can it then be said to be the causa-causa
causans of which was the actual physical appropriation of
the take.
Damages of the type complained .of by appellants accur
nothwiths'tanding the physical appropriation o.f lack thereof.
The existence of this type of damage is not dependent on
or related to the take. Rather, it affects those who suffer no
loss of property as well as those whose sustain a partial loss.
When thus sustained by all, the public in general, the
damage may not be said to be the direct result of .the take.
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If a damage is of such a nature as to exist irrespective
of the take or the absence thereof, then such damage must
be considered noncompensable consequential damage.
In an effort to render the alleged damages compensable,
appellants have attempted to distinguish the rule regarding
compensation between cases involving severance damage to
a remaining portion, part of which is taken, and damages
sustained by a landowner although no property is taken.
This distinction is evidently predicated on the language of
Utah Code Ann. § 78-34-10(2) and (3) (1953). However, this
statute is a definition of what constitutes just compensation
as set forth under Utah Const. art. I § 22, and must be so
interpreted and construed.
A review of the historical interpretation given to the
words "taken" and ''damages" as used in Utah Const. are. I
§ 22 reveals that this court has considered the constitutional
rights of compensation to be equal whether or not a physical
appropriation of a landowner's property has occurred.
In other words, the issue of compensable damages in a
situation involving a partial take and a situation involving
no physical appropriation of property remain the same.
Stockdale v. Rio Grande Railroad, 28 U. 207, 77 P. 849 (1904),
and Twenty-Second Corporation v. Oregon Shortline Rail-

road, 36 U. 238, 103 P. 243 (1909).
This court in State by State Road Commission v. District Court, Fourth Judicial District, 94 U. 384, 778 P.2d 502
(1937), stated at 78 P.2d 510:
The constitution clearly does not require compen-
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sation for damages not recognized as actionable at
common law, but for damaging of property "to the
actionable degree" the constitution makers intended
the landowner to have just compensation equally
with the landowner whose property was physically
taken.
It was thus developed that the situation involving a
partial take and damages to the remainder and damage to
property no part of which was taken in condemnation required equal treatment under the constitutional requirement
of j us't compensation.
The equality that exists between the two types of
situations is complete except for a procedural distinction
required by the application of the doctrine of sovereign
immunity. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton, 10 U.2d 100,
349 P.2d 157 (1960). As stated in Hampton v. State of Utah,
by and through its Road Commission, et al, 21 U.2d 342, 445
P.2d 708 (1968), at 21 U.2d 344.
It should be observed that this court has developed
a procedural distinction between a "taking" and
"damage," where the landowner has been denied
recovery in a situation involving the liability of a
highway authority for consequential damages.
Although the doctrine of sovereign immunity necessitated a procedural distinction between partial take cases
and cases involving damage to property no part of Which
was appropriated, the considerations as to the compensability
of damages remained the same. In Springville Banking Co.
v. Burton, supra, Certain consequential damages were considered to be noncompensable. This court refused to employ
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the extraordinary writ of mandamus because o'f the issue ol
sovereign immunity. However, this court further stated at
10 U.2d 102:
In this area of the freeway, citizens must yield to
the common weal albeit injury to their property
may result. We espouse the notion that if the sovereign exercises its police power, reasonably and
for the good of all the people, w'hen constructing
highways, consequential damages such as those
alleged here, are not compensable.
The noncompensability of the consequential damages
involved was clearly stated notwithstanding the application of the doctrine of sovereign immunity.
Appellants have failed to recognize this court's position
in Provo River Water Users Association v. Carlson, 103 U 93,
133 P.2d 777 (1943), wherein this court stated at 133 P.2d
779:
All of the cases in this court, which we have been
able to find, have predicated b o th severance
damages and damages to lands not taken, on some
physical injury to land not condemned. . . .
(Emphasis added.)
This court specifically and consistently has refused to
recognize a distinction predicated on the appropriation or
failure of appropriation of a landowner's property. To now
do so would be to do violence to precedent and contrary to
the recognized constitutional intention to place landowners
on an equal parity in determining damages nothwithstand·
ing the partial taking or lack thereof of a landowner's
property.
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Appellants place strong reliance on the case of Board of
Education of Logan City School District v. Croft, 13 U.Zd
310, 373 P.2d 697 (1962). However, respondent submits that
that case is distinguishable on its facts from the prohlem
presented in the instant case and further, that the dicta
contained in the Croft case is not sufficient to overrule the
precedent and reasoning that has evolved since the enactment of the Utah State Constitution.
CONCLUSION
Appellants have conceded that the alleged severance
damages not allowed by the trial court was no't of such a nature as to be special, unique and peculiar to the remaining
property owned by appellant, or that the damage was in excess of that sustained by the public in general. Based on the
rule that damages, to be compensable, must be causily connected to the take and also be a special, unique and peculair
nature not sus'tained by the public in general, the ruling
of the trial court was manifestly correct.
The great weight of authority recognizes a ,casual
connection requirement of a special, unqiue and pectJliar
damage in order to render the alleged damages compensable.
To distinguish between a situation involving a partial take
and a situation involving damage although no property is
physically appropriated, is a failure to re'cognize the
precedent of establishing the landowners in both situations
on an equal parity. The determination of the compensa:bili'ty
of damages in both situations is the same and the only difference between the two is a procedural distinction necesssi tated by and through the application of the doctdne of
::overeign immunity. To allow otherwise would be to dis-

1.2

criminate against the landowner whose property was no
physically appropriated but who, in fact, sustained the
same damages as the landowner who suffered a partial tak
ing of his property. In Utah, this court has failed to recog
nize such a disparity.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
GARY A. FRANK
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents

